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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
RUTH ETHEL DRURY MARSHALL,
et al.,
Plaintiffs and respondents,

vs.

Case No. 8792

GEORGE T. TAYLER,
Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ruth Ethel Drury Marshall brought action against
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the defendant, George T. Tayler, for personal injuries
arising out of an alleged tortious act of the defendant;
Fern Drury Tayler throu,gh intervention, sought recovery for personal injuries to herself rest4ting from the
same alleged tortious act of the defendant.
Fern Drury Tayler was the wife of the defendant
during all the time with which we are concerned. However, the defendant had filed his action for divorce from
Fern Drury Tayler prior to the accident complained of
and said filing regularly resulted in a divorce decree
being entered on or about October 16, 1956.
From a jury verdict in the Court below, the appellant appealed his cause to this Honorable Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant's statement of facts contained in his
brief on appeal is fairly representative of the facts in
this case with the exceptions and omissions thereto being
herewith set forth.
The defendant states that there is "some" testimony
that he "weaved" his car when backing up from the
motel the night of the accident which gave rise to plaintiff's action for damages, when in fact the husband of
plaintiff Ruth Ethel Drury Marshall testified that the
defendant "zig-zagged'. back and forth both in going
backward and in driving forward after completing his
backward 1notion (Tr. 121-122). The plaintiff Fern
Drury Tayler (Tr. 161-162), the plaintiff Ruth Ethel
Drury Marshall (Tr. 262-266), and the plaintiffs' mother
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3
Ethel G. Drury (Tr. 281-282) all testified to this fact.
Defendant fails to point out in his brief that after backing up in the aforementioned zig-zagging manner the·
appellant instantly proceeded forward in the same manner and knocked the plaintiff Fern Drury Tayler from
the automobile by driving so close to a soft-drink machine that she was slammed forcefully against it (Tr.
162-163, 263, 265-266). Defendant continued to zig-zag
under the canopy ·of a service station and drove so close
to a gas pump that the plaintiff Ruth Ethel Drury Marshall was dragged against it (Tr. 265-266).
Defendant also alleges in his brief that plaintiffs
abandoned the theory of intentional injury and ill will
by the statement of plaintiffs' counsel (Tr.156) that "I
do not intend to show he had any ill will, your Honor."
That this statement had reference only to the particular
facts upon which the questions were then being directed
is borne out by the failure of defendant's counsel to ask
for a dismissal of the case at that time upon the grounds
that the trial, at this point, was proceeding upon the pretrial order limiting the issue to intentional injury. Further proof upon this point lies in the fact that the case
was submitted to the jury upon the basis of intentional
injury which was not objected to by defendant upon the
ground complained of herein.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK OF INJURY
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4
TO THEMSELVES BY PLACING THEMSELVES IN A KNOWN
POSITION OF PERIL.
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT T'RESP ASS UPON DEFENDANT'S
MOTOR VEHICLE. HOWEVER, EVEN IF PLAINTIFFS WERE
TRESPASSERS, THE DEFEDANT WAS UNDER A DUTY TO
EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE TO AVOID INJURING THEM
AFTER THE DEFENDANT KNEW THEY WERE IN A POSITION OF PERIL.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT OF NO CAUSE OF
ACTION.
POINT IV
·THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY.
POINT V
A WIFE DOES HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
HER HUSBAND FOR A NON-INTENTIONAL INJURY INFLICTED BY HER HUSBAND DURING COVERTURE, AND
ESPECIALLY IS A HUSBAND UNDER A DUTY TO EXERCISE
REASONABLE CARE TO AVOID INJURING HIS WIFE AFTER
HE KNOWS SHE IS IN A POSITION OF PERIL.

ARGUMENT
· POINT I
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK OF INJURY
TO THEMSELVES BY PLACING THEMSELVES IN A KNOWN
POSITION OF PERIL.

Defendant contends that the act of plaintiffs in
running to the separate sides of defendant's automobile,
a 1955 Cadillac Coupe deVille, and holding on to the door
handles thereof constituted an assumption of risk on
their part for the damages sustained by them. The evidence is undisputed that the plaintiffs did hold on to
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the handles of the car doors as they leaned over to attempt conversation with the defendant who. was sitting in the driver's seat with the doors and :Vindows
locked (Tr. 161, 171, 260, 277, 294).

Certainly the act

of holding a door handle on an automobile while carrying on a conversation with one inside the automobile is
a common, everyday experience for all of us. Such an
act cannot be said to be inherently dangerous and known
to be so by those of us who automatically act as th~
plaintiffs did in this instance by holding the automobile
door handle for support while directing conversation to
the occupant therein. And this is even more common
in this day and age of low-built automobiles which an
individual of ordinary height can see entirely over by
standing erect. The plaintiff Fern Drury Tayler testified that the sudden jerk and simultaneous weaving of
the automobile as the defendant put it in reverse motion
swept her off her feet and she thereafter instinctively
held on to the door handle to avoid being thrown under
the weaving wheels of the auto. As the car weaved
backwards she was unable to regain her balance, and
the automobile's forW1ard motion was so instantaeous
with the end of its backward movement that she was
never able to right herself and would have most assuredly been run over had she let go of the door handle.
In fact she never let go of the door handle until she was
knocked off the vehicle by being slammed against an
object, namely a soft-drink vending machine (Tr. 161-
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162). The same situation prevailed as to the plaintiff
Ruth Ethel Drury Marshall according to her testimony
(Tr. 262-263'), except that she was eventually dragged
against a gas pump (Tr. 263, 266).

Even this painful

experience did not cause her to let go of the door handle
for fear of her life and it was not until the defendant's
automobile headed for the open highway, at the same
time picking up terrific speed, that she felt her better
chance for survival required her to let go of the door
handle (Tr. 266). Contrary to defendant's allegations,
neither of the plaintiffs were in a known position of
danger until the defendant's wrongful act swept them
from their feet and from that time on they acted as any
reasonable person under the circumstances would have
acted. They were then faced with the choice of dropping
off the automobile and risking their lives under the viciously weaving wheels or to continue to hold on to the
door handles in the hope that ordinary, human compassion would lead the defendant to relieve them from their
peril. That they chose the latter course is not surprising - in fact it is reasonable to assume that any ordinary individual under like circumstances would have
acted in the same manner. And the jury, upon proper
instruction by the court on the doctrine of assumption
of risk, so found (R. 73, 84, 88). The authorities cited
by defendant thus have no application to the facts of
this case, and this court should not, as a matter of law,
reverse the jury's findings upon the alleged defense of
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assumption of risk. Defendant relies upon the tests laid
down by this court in Clay v. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239
P. 2d 1075, as supporting his defense. The tests outlined
therein for a valid defense of assumption of risk included
(1) that the plaintiff must have looked, must have seen
and mmst have known of the danger, and (2) that he
volutarily subjected himself thereto. As stated by the
·court in that case, "knowledge of the risk is the watchword of * * * assumption of risk." It is respectfully
submitted that these plaintiffs had no knowledge of any
risk based upon a visual and considered appraisal of
conditions confronting them until their very survival
depended upon their ability to cling to the door handles
of defendant's automobile. In this regard the jury was
in unanimous agreement. See the case of Byers v. Gunn
discussed under Point II wherein the plaintiff and three
others had seated themselves upon the front fenders and
hood of defendant's car after b~ing refused admittance
and plaintiff was thereafter thrown from the car and
injured. In that case the court held that the plaintiff
was not guilty of assumption of risk or contributory
negligence as a matter of law and refused to interfere
with the jury's conclusion in these matters after it was
properly instructed by the trial court.
POINT II
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ·TRESPASS UPON DEFENDANT'S
MOTOR VEHICLE. HOWEVER, EVEN IF PLAINTIFFS WERE
TRESPASSERS, THE DEFENDANT WAS UNDER A DUTY TO
EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE TO AVOID INJURING THEM
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AFTE'R THE DEFENDANT KNEW THEY WERE IN A POSITION OF PERIL.

A trespasser is defined as "One who has committed
trespass; one who unlawfully enters or intrudes upon
another's land, or unlawfully and forcibly takes another's personal property." Black's Law Dictionary. A
"trespass' is a transgression or wrongful act, and in its
most extensive signification includes every description
of wrong, and a "trespasser" is one who does an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner, to the
injury of the person or property of another. Carter v.
Haynes, (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas), 269 S.W. 216.
It is difficult to see how the plaintiffs in this case (one
the wtie of the defendant- the other his sister-in-law)
c.~-liA
liJ? tl« be held to be trespassers uj>on the defendant's
automobile. They testified that they only wanted to
talk to the defendant (Tr. 161, 260-261), and they had
no intention of interfering with his possession of the
automobile (Tr. 171, 277-278). Certainly this wife had
the right to converse with her husband and to hope that
he might respond. It would seem that the same privilege
of communication should extend to his sister-in-law
without constituting a trespass. Their holding of the
automobile handles for the mere purpose of balance
while attempting to converse with the defendant did
not in any manner conflict with his possessory interest
in the automobile nor did they cause any injury or exercise dominion over this automobile in any way damaging to the defendant. We respectfully submit that this
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act of plaintiffs in holding o~to the door handles of this
automobile did at no time constitute a trespass upon the
defendant's motor vehicle. It is certainly an ordinary
occurrence for a w.ife to exercise dominion over her
husband's automobile to a much greater degree than the
mere holding of its door handles before being considered
a "trespasser".
However, even if these plaintiffs were to be considered trespassers, the defendant would have no reason
to complain of the negligence verdict in this case. It is
a true statement of the law that the operator of an automobile owes to trespassers only the duty to refrain from
wantonly or willfully causing injury to them after their
presence becomes known to the driver. BUT where the
operator knows that the trespasser is in a position of
peril, he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
avoid injuring him. Voltz v. Orange Volunteer Fire Association, 118 Conn. 307, 172 A. 220; Ice Delivery Company v. Thomas, 290. Ky. 230, 160 S.W.2d. 37. Defendant
cites the case of Byers v. Gunn, Florida, 81, So.2d. 723, in
support of their claim when in fact that case is directly
in point in this case to support the plaintiffs' position.
In the Gunn case the defendant's minor daughter, while
driving her father's automobile, had stopped at a stop
street.
Four youngsters, including the plaintiff, approached the car and asked for a ride, which was refused. The daughter rolled up the windows and locked
the doors, whereupon the four intruders sat down on
the front fenders and hood of the car. The driver started
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the car in motion and, after attaining speeds up to 40
miles per hour, stepped on the brake causing the plaintiff to be thrown off and severely injured. The Supreme.
Court of Florida, affirming the lower court, allowed the
plaintiff to recover upon a verdict of negligence. In so
holding the court stated:
The injured girl was a trespasser and the
trial judge so informed the jury. The rule of law
is clear that the standard of care owed to a trespasser is to refrain from committing a willful or
wanton injury. This rule, however, gives way
to the further proposition that after discovery of
the peril to a trespasser, the driver of the automobile is then duty-bound to exercise reasonable
care and caution under the circumstances. Absent contributory negligence on the part of the
injured person there would appear to be no justifiable excuse for injuring a person in a position
of manifest peril if such injury can be reasonably
avoided, or as otherwise stated, if such injury
can be avoided by the exercise of reasonable
care and caution in the light of all the circumstances in the particular case.
The court further held in this case that it could not be
concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence or assumption of risk,
and that the court was not justified in substituting its
judgement for that of the jury.
There can be no question but that the defendant in
this case was aware of the peril of the plaintiffs after he
put his automobile in motion. The weaving and zigzagging previously referred to was aimed directly at
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dislodging the plaintiffs from their precarious positions
in being dragged while holding the door handles of the
automobile. Furthermore it was testified on behalf of
plaintiffs that th~re was no reason for defendant to drive
under the canopy of the service station (Tr. 151, 163164). The fact that one plaintiff was slammed against
a cola vending machine and the other against a gas pump
as a result of this choice of direction by defendant is too
far outside the realm of chance to have been accidental.
The defendant himself testified that the plaintiffs were
hanging on to his car handles (Tr. 335, 336). He also
testifi~d that "I looked to the side of me, and it seemed
to me, I saw Fern drop off." (Tr. 295). Also "I saw
Ruth's head bouncing up and down" (Tr. 295), and "I
pulled along and I kept on going, until Ruth finally saw
I was going, and she let go, and when she did, I knew
she had made a mistake." (Tr. 296). The jury found
that the defendant did not use due care for the safety
of the plaintiffs (R. 83, 86) and that plaintiffs did not
asssume the risk of injury to themselves (R. 84, 88) nor
were they contributorily negligent (R. 84, 87). In view
of the above the verdict of the jury must be sustained.
POINT III
TH.E COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT OF· NO CAUSE OF
ACTION.

We shall first consider that portion of defendant's
motion asking for a directed verdict based upon the
ground that plaintiffs committed an assault upon him.
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An assault is any act of such a nature as to excite an
apprehension of a battery.

It is well settled law that

an assault must amount to an offer to use force and there
must be an apparent present ability and opportunity to
carry out the threat immediately. Prosser on Torts, §10,
p. 50;Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hill, 25 Ala. App. 540,
150 So. 709. In this case there is no evidence whatsoever of an offer to use force upon the defendant by the
plaintiffs, and certainly no threat nor threatening movement on the part of the plaintiffs. In fact the evidence
is conclusive that the plaintiffs nor no members of their
families had ever threatened the defendant -

in fact

they were very good friends, including plaintiff Marshall's husband (Tr. 114, 170, 178), and the plaintiff
Marshall (Tr. 275). Plaintiff Tayler testified that she
had never had an altercation with her husband, the defendant, nor did they ever have a violent argument in
the sense that either lost his temper and struck the
other (Tr. 155). In fact the record indicates only one
argument in which any of the principals in this action
were active and the record is conclusive upon the fact
that the defendant precipitated the whole argument by
referring to the plaintiff's grandmother as a "wicked,
cruel old witch" upon being shown her picture (Tr. 177,
257, 290). The defendant even admits that Mr. Marshall
took no part in this exchange of words (Tr. 290).
Indicative of the defendant's entire failure to make
out an assault upon him at the time of the accident here
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involved are the following portions of his testimony:

"* * * and if she (Mrs. Marshall) could stall
me until Monty (Mr. Marshall) got out of the
truck - the danger was coming from Monty, not
these two women." (Tr. 343).
"When I looked back, Mr. Marshall \vas cqming between the service station * * * and I did not
know whether he had anything in his hand or not.
I could not see because of the darkness."
Upon being asked if he saw something in his hand, he
answered "No, I could not see." (Tr. 366).

"I was more or less afraid of Mr. Marshall,
and Mr. Marshall is a tire man. I did not know
what he would do in a case where I am going to
drive away * * *.
Mr. Marshall is a very fine man. Mr. Marshall and myself never had any trouble * * *."
And in answer to the question whether defendant ever
knew of Mrs. Marshall suggesting to her husband that
he beat up the defendant, the defendant answered "No."
(Tr. 332).
"As I looked out the back of my car, I saw
Mr. Marshall coming through between the pumps
of the service station. Now whether he would do
anything, I don't know, but I knew he was coming, and I was not taking any chances * * *." (Tr.
296).
"I am not afraid of Mr. Marshall * * *." (Tr.
333).
The evidence clearly indicates, that no time was defendant faced with a threat of battery or the use of force
let alone the further requisite of present apparent ability
on the part of plaintiffs to carry into effect any imagined
violence on the person of the defendant. The courts have
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been reluctant to protect extremely timid individuals
from exaggerated fears of contact, and have required
quite· uniformly that the apprehension be one which
would normally be aroused in the mind of a reasonable
person. Prosser on Torts, supra. The defendant clearly
intended to avoid any conversation with the plaintiffs
and the plaintiffs' pleadings with defendant to let them
talk to him cannot be said to constitute an assault upon
him.
As to the defendant's second ground for a directed
verdict based upon the theory of plaintiffs being trespassers and guilty of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence as a matter of law, we refer the Court to our
argument under Points I and II. For the reasons stated in
Point II, the plainti~fs were not trespassers, and even if
they were, the defendant owed them the duty to exercise
reasonable care to avoid injuring them after their position of peril became apparent to him. For the reasons
stated under Point I, plaintiffs were not guilty of assumption of risk. For the same reasons the plaintiffs
were not contributorily negligent.
The juTy, being
properly instructed upon these points without exception
being taken thereto by defendant, found the plaintiffs
to be free of contributory negligence and this court
should not, as a matter of law, inter}Aiere with that finding. Defendant cites to the court many rulings of this
court to the effect that contributory negligence becomes
a question of law where the evidence is such that reasonable minds could not differ that the conduct in question
failed to meet the standard of due care. These cases are
absolutely correct, but we cannot agree with defendant
that reasonable minds could not differ upon the standard
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of care exercised by plaintiffs in this case. We submit
that the act of holding onto an automobile door handle
while conversing, or attempting to converse, with one
inside the automobile cannot be said to violate the standard of due care. And plaintiffs' continued grasp on the
door handles after being swept from their feet by defendant's wrongful action certainly cannot be said to fail the
test of due care, as a matter of law, when the only alternative at that time was to drop off and risk their lives
under the weaving wheels of the automobile. We further submit that defendant's argument to the effect that
the plaintiffs should have released the door handles during that fleeting moment that the automobile necessarily
stood still when changing from reverse to forward motion is not satisfactory in light of the facts as testified
by plaintiffs, and apparently believed by the jury, that
they were unable to perceive of any immobility of the
automobile and were unable to regain their balance before the defendant's forward weaving motion continued
them in their position of peril. To say that reasonable
minds could not differ as to lack of due care shown by
plaintiffs under these circumstances would do violence
to all concepts of justice. In fact it would seem more conscionable to hold that reasonable minds must conclude
that the conduct of plaintiffs met every standard of due
care. The minds of eight reasonable jurymen so concluded.
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POINT IV
·THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO SUBMI'T THE ISSUE OF ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY.

As to defendant's further reiteration of his claim
that plaintiffs were trespassers, we herewith incorporate
the argument set forth in our Point II.
POINT V
A WIFE DOES HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
HER HUSBAND FOR A NON-INTENTIONAL INJURY INFLICTED BY HER HUSBAND DURING COVERTURE, AND
ESPECIALLY IS A HUSBAND UNDER A DUTY TO EXERCISE
REASONABLE CARE ·TO AVOID INJURING HIS WIFE AFTER
HE KNOWS SHE IS IN A POSITION OF PERIL.

The record in this case is conclusive that defendant
had filed his suit for divorce from plaintiff Fern Drury
Tayler sometime prior to the date of the accident complained of (Tr. 168-169, 285) and the divorce decree was
granted defendant on or about October 16, 1956 (Tr.
290). And the record -is further conclusive that the
defendant and his wife, plaintiff Fern Drury Tayler,
were not living together at the time of the injury which
precipitated this action, nor were they living together
under the same roof at any time during their entire 5lj2
years of marriage (Tr. 153-154, 167-168, 194-195, 198201, 208, 285-286, 291, 302-303, 306, 323).
Defendant relies upon the limitation of this Court's
opinion based upon the facts in the case of Taylor v.
Patten, 2 Utah 2d. 404, 275 P.2d 696, to sustain his argument that a wife may not sue her husband for a nonintentional injury inflicted by the husband during cov-
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erture. In that case, an action against plaintiff's former
husband for assault on plaintiff while they were living
apart during the interlocutory period of their divorce
action, this Court ruled that, under statutes then exisiting and unchanged at the present time, "* * * a wife
may recover from her husband for intentionally inflicted
injuries." This holding was necessarily restrictive because of the facts presented by the case. However, in
arriving at this conclusion, the court was presented with
the problem of whether our Husband and Wife statutes
removed the disability of a wife to sue or be sued at
common law without regard to the nature of the action
or the intent involved. In arriving at his conclusion
Justice Wade reasoned thus:

* * * Under modern Husband and Wife statutes, such as ours, this fiction has been completely
eliminated and the wife has been completely
emancipated from this inability to own, control
and manage her property, and from her inability
to sue or be sued for the protection of her property and personal rights. The reason for her inability and lack of rights has been completely eliminated with the logical result that such courts hold
her disabilities and loss of rights have completely
disappeared with the common law fiction that the
husband and wife are one. Since the reason on
which that disability was based has been eliminated, it is not necessary now to have an additionaL express statutory provision declaring that marriage does not disable a party thereto in enforcing
tort liability against the other spouse.
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There is nothing in the above reasoning of the Court
which would indicate that the removal of the wife's
common law disabilities under our statutes., should be
/n:lt-,,IDhrti~/!J',
construed to include only redress for inteR-tig~taJ. inflicted injuries. Quite to the contrary, the use of terms
such as "completely eliminated", "completely emancipated", "completely disappeared", and "marriage does
not disable a party thereto in enforcing tort liability
against the other spouse" indicate the Court's feeling that
the entire field of a wife's common law disabilities, including the right to sue her husband for injuries inflicted
negligently as well as intentionally, was abrogated by
the Utah statutes.
As a further indication of this Court's recognition
of the right of a married woman to sue her husband for
negligent tort we further quote from the Taylor v. Patten
case:

* * * From the foregoing it is clear that the
legislature intended to establish the separate
identity of the husband and wife in all property
and personal rights the same as if they were not
married. Giving these statutes a liberal construction to effect their objects and in the interest of
justice requires us to hold that a wife can sue and
be sued the same as if she were unmarried. * * *
In the case of Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn.
889, an action by a wife against her husband
damages for assault and battery and false
ment, the court, in holding that the action

42, 89 Atl.
to recover
imprisonwould lie

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19
under the Connecticut .Married Woman's Act, said:

* * * The right to contract with the husband,
and to sue him for breach of contract, and to sue
for torts, is not given to the wife by the statute.
These are rights which belonged to her before
marriage, and, because of the new marriage status
created by the statute, are not lost by the fact of
marriage, as they were under the common-lavv
status. The status of the parties after marriage
being fixed, there was no occasion for providing
in express terms what the consequences would be.
They followed logically. * * *
In Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432,
44 A.L.R. 785, the Connecticut court applied the decision
in Brown v. Brown to a case of neglience. Likewise,
the following cases have permitted a wife to sue her
husband for negligent tort under similar married women's statutes: Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87
P.2d 660; Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335, 140 So. 378;
Katzenberg v. Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696;
Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740; Roberts v.
Roberts, 185 N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9, 29 A.L.R. 1479; Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526; Fontaine v. Fontaine, 205 Wis. 570, 238 N.W. 410; Brown v.
Gosser (Ky.), 262 S.W. 2d. 480.
As was stated in the exhaustive study of this problem in the Courtney case, supra: "Nor can the difference
in the nature of the torts committed be seriously considered from a legal standpoint * * *. In the case of a
negligent tort, the wife has suffered a wrong for which
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the law· should provide a remedy just as in the case of
wilful tort."
In light of the above authorities, and the reasoning
employed by this Court in arriving at its conclusion in
the Taylor v. Patten case, plaintiffs submit that the Utah
statutes do, in fact, accomplish a complete emancipation
for married women from their common-law disabilities
including the right to sue their spouses for injuries resulting from negligent, as well as wilful, tort.
And, assuming for sake of argument, that the rule
in Taylor v. Patten does in fact negate the recovery by
a wife against her husband for negligent conduct, plaintiffs are of the opinion that the exception to the requirement of intentional injury in the case of trespassers
would be applicable to this case, namely that the defendant was under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
avoid injuring his wife after he discovered her in a
position of peril. An operator of an automobile owes to
trespassers only the duty to refrain from intentionally
causing injury to them, but where the trespasser is in a
position of peril known to the operator, he is then under
the duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring
the trespasser. Byers v. Gunn, supra. We can see no
difference in that case and the one posed by defendant
assuming that plaintiff Tayler could recover only for
intentional acts of the defendant. We incorporate our
arguments set forth in Point II as equally applicable to
the situation herein assumed.
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The serious consequences which have often been
suggested as the reason for eliminating the disability at
common law of a married woman to sue her husband
for his tortious acts simply have not materialized. This
Court recognized this fact in the Taylor v. Patten case,
supra, when it made note of the fact that the number of
states which do allow such a recovery is constantly increasing. Likewise the legal writers have followed almost unanimously the growing minority. Prosser on
Torts, §99, p. 904, has this to say on the subject:
An exhaustive analysis of the problem in a
recent Oklahoma decision (Courtney v. Courtney,
supra) seems to leave no justification for the
majority rule except that of historical survival.
Defendant cites an exhaustive annotation, 43 ALR 2d 634,
in which the majority rule is referred to as a "dwindling
majority." This undisputed fact that the jurisdictions
embracing the doctrine of a wife's right to sue her husband in tort are steadily increasing is most significant of
the fitness of such a rule to assimilate itself with the
public policy and needs of the present day. This court
having taken the proper step forward by its decision in
Taylor v. Patten, supra, should not now reverse itself
and thereby adopt an outmoded and archaic fiction,
born of the "dark ages", which is now withering and
destined to die upon the vine of progress.
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case clearly sustains the j udgment of the lower court. Plaintiffs were not trespassers
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upon the property of the defendant, nor were they guilty
of assault, contributory negligence or assumption of
risk for their resultant injuries. These injuries were
the sole result of defendant's negligence in failing tQ
exercise the ordinary degree of care required of him
toward the plaintiffs, and the jury so found upon proper
instruction.
This Court has, upon mature reflection and analysis,
aligned itself with the decisions of a rapidly growing
minority by heretofore holding that a married woman,
under our statute, may sue her husband for injuries suffered as a result of his tortious acts upon her person including negligent as well as intentional violations thereof, and, therefore, the judgment of the lower court should
be affirmed, and plaintiffs awarded their costs on this
appeal.
Respectfully submitted

ROMNEY AND NELSON
DONN E. CASSITY
JACK L. CRELLIN

Attorneys for Respondents
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